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11 Introduction
The establishment of the euro has been highly successful. Nevertheless, whilst some Member States
have fully enjoyed the beneﬁts of belonging to the currency union, notably by experiencing high
growth rates, there have been large divergences in growth rates. One example of these diﬀerences in
economic performance is the protracted period of slow growth and low inﬂation in Germany, from
2001 onwards, which contrasts with a prolonged period of high growth and more rapid inﬂation in
Ireland and Spain. Such divergences partly reﬂect the process of economic catching up underway in
certain euro-area members. But even within the latter group, there have been marked diﬀerences
over an extended period. Most strikingly, since 1990 Ireland has achieved particularly rapid real
convergence, which has led to living standards above the euro-area average since 1997. On the other
hand, Portugal experienced a stalling of real convergence after 2000.
What factors lay behind such inter-EMU divergences? The conventional view is that they
relate to long-standing issues about progress in enhancing the ﬂexibility of markets. This leads to
the conventional suggestion that to improve performance the emphasis should be on supply side
ﬂexibility — and on the Lisbon agenda.
However there is another possibility. This is that interactions between competitiveness, prices
and ﬁscal positions within EMU might cause inter-country divergences to cumulate, even in the
presence of supply-side ﬂexibility.
Within EMU the adjustment process which brings national conditions back in line with the
euro-area average works as follows. Within EMU, there is a single centralised monetary policy. A
recession in one nation, caused, say, by competitiveness in that nation being less than in the rest
of the union, will not lead to an EMU-wide a response in monetary policy, either if the country is
small, or if there is a corresponding, oﬀsetting, boom elsewhere. But it will lead to an reduction in
inﬂation in that nation, and to a corresponding gain in competitiveness there, and this will moderate
the recession. Similarly the reverse will occur if there is a boom in one nation, caused, say, by a
gain in competitiveness there; inﬂation will rise there and so the competitiveness of that nation
will worsen, damping the boom. The former kind of adjustment is what has been happening in
Germany throughout the present decade. The conventional view is that this equilibrating process
will work satisfactorily, so as to ensure inter-country adjustment within EMU. This conventional
view is discussed in detail in Commission of the European Communities (2006).
It has long been believed that this adjustment process will be diﬃcult within a monetary union.
The speed of the process will necessarily depend on the degree of price ﬂexibility; within a monetary
union competitiveness cannot be rapidly adjusted by exchange rate change. If this price ﬂexibility
is low then the adjustment process will be prolonged. Hence the conventional beliefs, described
above, about the need to promote supply-side ﬂexibility.
1In this paper we explore a new and diﬀerent argument about the diﬃculty of adjustment, to
do with the dynamics of the adjustment process. We show that diﬃculty depends not only on the
degree of price ﬂexibility but also on the degree of forward-lookingness in the economy. We show
that in a monetary union in which (i) a suﬃcient number of price setters follow a backward-looking
adjustment process and (ii) a suﬃcient number of consumers are indebted and credit constrained
(and so cannot practice forward-looking consumption smoothing) there can be forces which oﬀset
the stabilising forces described above, and which can lead towards cumulative divergence between
countries.
1.1 Analysis of the paper
The ECB sets a single nominal interest rate for all euro-zone countries. In countries experiencing a
loss of competitiveness and so a recession, inﬂation will begin to fall gradually. (How gradually it falls
will depend on the degree of forward-lookingness of price-setters.) The opposite is true in countries
experiencing a boom. This means that in uncompetitive countries with a recession the real interest
rate (the single common nominal rate minus domestic inﬂation) will begin to rise, and vice-versa in
competitive countries experiencing a boom. But as the real interest rate gradually rises in countries
with a recession, consumption will gradually fall (at least amongst credit constrained consumers).
As a result there will be further downward pressures on domestic economic activity. This means
that the rate of inﬂation will fall, the real interest rate will rise further, and consumption will fall
further. Output may continue to fall, even although the country is becoming more competitive. The
opposite is true in the countries with a boom. As a result, while aggregate inﬂation in the euro-zone
may be on target, inﬂation rates across individual countries may not converge; the resulting real
interest rate diﬀerences may diverge, and outputs may diverge cumulatively. This may happen,
even although the relative competitive position of countries changes, in a direction which would
promote convergence, in the conventional manner described above. The present paper analyses this
adjustment diﬃculty using a formal model. The model will be used to examine how the possibility
of cumulative divergence depends on the degree of forward-lookingness in both consumption and
price-setting.
We will show that, within this model, a tendency towards divergence could not arise without
both kinds of backward-lookingness. First, we will show that the problem of divergence could not
arise if all price setting were forward-looking. In this case, the inﬂation rate would immediately
jump down in the uncompetitive economy, and then gradually return to equilibrium in such a
way as to return the competitiveness of the economy to its required level. The opposite would
happen in the competitive economy. The forward-lookingness of price setters would ensure that the
economies did not diverge. Second, we will show that divergence could not arise if all consumers
were forward-looking. Even if inﬂation were entirely backward looking, and only adjusted gradually,
forward-looking consumers in the uncompetitive country would immediately jump down their level
2of consumption, in response to a projected sequence of higher interest rates in the future, and, after
this their consumption would gradually rise again. The recession in the economy would be removed
over time, along with the economy’s gradual improvement in competitiveness. The opposite would
happen in the competitive economy. Forward-looking consumers would ensure that the economies
did not diverge.1
The paper will also show that forward-lookingness in price setting and in consumption can
substitute for each other in avoiding such cumulative divergence. Using a particular calibration
of the model, we show that the larger the proportion of consumers who are liquidity constrained,
the greater the proportion of forward-looking price setters has to be to avoid the possibility of
cumulative divergence. Similarly, the smaller the proportion of price setters who are forward-
looking, the greater the proportion of forward-looking proportion of consumers needs to be to avoid
the possibility of cumulative divergence.
Going on from this, the paper also shows that, even if this adjustment process is stable, compet-
itiveness can overshoot in this adjustment process, causing cyclical outcomes. Using the particular
calibration of the model, we show that in the uncompetitive economy, the adjustment process can
cause "too much" deﬂation, so that the price level overshoots too far in the downward direction.
This is what appears to have been happening in Germany recently.
Finally, the paper shows that ﬁscal policy could contribute to this adjustment process, oﬀsetting
the way in which real interest rates eﬀects push in the wrong direction. We show that ﬁscal policy
could help to avoid a process of cumulative divergence, given the degree of backward-lookingness
of consumption and of price-setting in the economy. Further we show that, even if cumulative
divergence was avoided, ﬁscal policy could help to dampen any overshooting of competitiveness and
cycles. We also show that tightly controlling debt, as required by the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), can prevent ﬁscal policy having either of these eﬀects. Our model thus suggests that, in a
world in which there is a considerable degree of backward-lookingness, the SGP does not provide
a framework which will facilitate inter-European adjustment. This may be the case, even although
the SGP might provide a valuable framework in which the aggregate ﬁscal stability of the Euro area
as a whole can be managed.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section of the paper, we present some data which
suggests that the diﬃculties which we have just described may be real diﬃculties within EMU. In
Section 3 we sketch a very simple model which gives an analytical proof of the argument described
above.
Then in Sections 4 and 5, we develop our argument using a microfounded macro model in which
1We will see that if consumers are forward-looking, but all price-setters are backward looking, the economy will
only just be stable; it will cycle in an undamped manner. If some price setters are also forward-looking, then the
resulting cycles will be damped.
3the inﬂation process is partly forward-looking and partly backward-looking, and in which some
consumers are forward-looking, and act as if they are inﬁnitely lived, but in which other consumers
are credit constrained. We examine a standard calibration of the model, and use it to perform the
analysis described above.
Section 6 considers policy implications of this analysis. A ﬁnal section concludes.
There already exist important papers on the subject of this paper, namely the conduct of ﬁscal
policy in a monetary union in which there are nominal rigidities, in particular those by Gali and
Monacelli (2005b) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005). The contribution of present paper it to show that
the task for ﬁscal policy is more demanding if (a) the nominal rigidities arise from a partly forward-
looking and partly backward-looking inﬂation process which gives rise to inﬂation persistence, and
(b) not all consumers are forward-looking but there are also credit constrained consumers. The
ﬁrst of these features is contained in the model in Kirsanova et al. (2007), but the model in that
paper contains no credit-constrained consumers. Both of these features are present in the model of
Kirsanova et al. (2006); the model of the present paper is an extension of the model in that paper,
obtained by adding a public sector to the model in that paper.
2 Inter-country diﬀerences
Figure 1 to 5 display some relevant recent developments in the Euro area. These ﬁgures show steady
divergence.
The German economy entered EMU with high costs, in an uncompetitive position; Figure 1
shows a continuing relative gain in competitiveness for Germany since then. Similarly this ﬁgure
shows a continuing loss of competitiveness for Spain and Portugal; which entered EMU with low
costs, in a competitive position. This cumulative gain or loss is repeated, as a long and drawn-out
process, in a number of countries including Italy. Wickens (2007) draws attention to this feature.
Figure 2 shows that real interest rates have been high, and have remained high, in the country,
Germany, which entered EMU in an uncompetitive position, even although competitiveness has
been continuing to improve, as a result of relatively low inﬂation. Similarly real interest rates have
been low in Spain, even although its competitive position has been continuing to worsen, as a result
of relatively high inﬂation. (The same is true for Portugal.) This position has been sustained not
just for a short period, but over the full period since the creation of EMU, suggesting pronounced
overshoot in response to the shock. Figure 3 shows that this has been a feature of long rates as well
as short rates.
Figures 4 and 5 describe further aspects of the adjustment process. They show the German
current account balance moving into a marked surplus, as the real exchange rate has become more
competitive. Figure 4 suggests that this adjustment process may have gone far enough by 2004 or
2005, and that the continuing improvement in the German real exchange rate since then may have
gone too far. It is apparent that German ﬁscal policy has not played a part in helping to bring the
4real exchange rate to a longer term equilibrium position. (The German ﬁscal ﬁgure for the year
2000 should be discounted because this was when German telephone licences were auctioned.) Such
a policy might have required a more contractionary stance early in the period — to help bring the
initial adjustment about more quickly - and a more expansive position more recently, to prevent
the real exchange rate being driven down too far. The Spanish position also does not show ﬁscal
policy moderating the recent private sector boom, a boom which has been assisted by a low real
interest rate. This boom has continued to drive the Spanish real exchange rate in an uncompetitive
direction. (In the case of Portugal an uncompetitive position has been sustained for nearly a decade,
and the continuing ﬁscal deﬁcit has not played a part in adjusting this position. Similarly, in Greece
ﬁscal policy does not appear to have played a part in adjusting the external position.)
The models which follow in Sections 3 and 4 are designed to explain such cumulative divergence
shown in these Figures.
3 A very simple model of a small member of a monetary union
We ﬁrst demonstrate analytically that the kind of cumulative instability, discussed in the introduc-
tion to the paper, is possible; and we show how ﬁscal policy might prevent such instability. We
do this assuming that the behaviour of both consumers and price setters is entirely backward look-
ing. We then show that if either (a) all price-setters are forward-looking, or (b) all consumers are
forward-looking, then this might be suﬃcient to remove such a tendency to cumulative instability.
We are able to show this using a simple model in continuous time. A fuller model is developed in
the next section in discrete time; in that model both consumption and price setting are determined
by a mixture of forward-looking and backward-looking behaviour.
In both this section and next section we suppose that the country is small enough that devel-
opments in it do not inﬂuence the interest rate in the union as a whole.
3.1 A fully backward-looking model
We represent output as follows
y = c + σs + g, (1)
where y is output in the particular country, c is consumption in the country, s competitiveness of
the country, where an increase in s denotes a depreciation in the real exchange rate of the country,
and g is government spending. We suppose that consumers are credit constrained and indebted,
so that a rise in the real interest rate causes a reduction in consumption; for simplicity we here
model this eﬀect in a static way. (In the full model in the next section consumption expenditure is
derived from microfoundations and partly forward-looking and partly backward-looking, and so the
relevant expression is more complicated.) Noting that the real interest rate r is aﬀected negatively
5by the inﬂation rate, π, we write
c = ςπ. (2)
We can represent ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation and on the real exchange rate as
g = −θπ + λs. (3)
We can thus represent output in the economy by an equation in which the divergence in output in
the country depends on inﬂation and on its real exchange rate relative to the rest of the monetary
union
y = δπ + ǫs, (4)
where δ = (ς−θ). The sign of δ depends on ﬁscal feedback; δ > 0 unless ﬁscal feedback is suﬃciently
strong. ǫ = (σ + λ) is necessarily positive because any ﬁscal feedback from the real exchange rate
augments competitiveness eﬀects.
We represent inﬂation as follows. In continuous time we can write a NAIRU Phillips curve with
backward looking price setters as
˙ π = γy, (5)
where γ > 0.
Finally, in a monetary union, inﬂation in the country erodes its competitiveness relative to that
in the rest of the union,
˙ s = −π. (6)



















Here inﬂation is a predetermined variable, and, since competitiveness s is also predetermined,
we need two negative roots if there is to be stability. But, in the absence of ﬁscal feedback δ = ς > 0,
because of the eﬀect of inﬂation on the real interest rate and so γδ > 0. Also
 
γ2δ2 − 4γǫ < γδ. As
a result both of the roots are positive, and so no stable solution exists. This means that if for some
reasons, the economy starts out of the steady state, for example it is uncompetitive and so that s is
below equilibrium, inﬂation will fall without limit, consumption will collapse, and competitiveness
will improve without limit.
There are two forces at work determining this unstable outcome. Consider a shock which makes
the economy uncompetitive.2 Output falls and so inﬂation begins to fall, which gradually causes the
2We could extend our analysis to a stochastic setting, since linear models are certainty equivalent.
6competitive position to improve, and this of itself makes output increase. But the fall in inﬂation
also causes the real interest rate to rise which causes consumption to fall, which of itself makes
output decrease. Since, as here, all price setting is backward looking and so inﬂation only adjusts
gradually, changes in the level of competitiveness are only gradual, and occur as the integral of
the changes in inﬂation. By contrast, changes in the rate of inﬂation, and in the real interest rate,
occur immediately once output falls. This is why these eﬀects dominate, and go on dominating,
cumulatively, oﬀsetting the eﬀects of improvements in competitiveness. The danger of this outcome
became known as ‘Walters’ critique’, stemming from the opposition of Sir Alan Walters to British
membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS), when he
was advisor to Margaret Thatcher. This idea lies at the heart of the analysis in this paper.
This potential for instability in ﬁxed exchange rate regimes is raised inKirsanova et al. (2006).
Surprisingly it is not discussed in textbook accounts of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rate regimes,
and does not feature in most oﬃcial discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of monetary
unions (Commission of the European Communities (1990), H.M.Treasury (2003)).
In the present simple model, such an unstable outcome can only be avoided if ﬁscal policy is
suﬃciently strong in its repose to inﬂation, so as to make δ = (ς − θ) < 0. In that case both roots
will be negative and stability obtains. In that case the reduction in inﬂation will cause both a
gradual increase in competitiveness and an immediate increase in domestic expenditure, because —
by construction — the positive eﬀects of falling inﬂation on ﬁscal expenditure outweigh the negative
eﬀects on consumption coming from a rising real interest rate.
If ﬁscal policy ensures that δ = (ς −θ) < 0 and so that the roots are negative and the system is
stable, cycles in competitiveness may nevertheless occur. This will happen if the eigenvalues of the
system are complex. By inspection, this will occur if ε is large enough, which will be the case if the
eﬀect of competitiveness on demand is large. To prevent such cycles, the ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation
would need to be large enough not only to make δ positive but also to large enough to ensure that
γ2δ2 − 4γǫ is positive, and so prevent such cyclical behavior. Likewise if the ﬁscal feedback on
the real exchange rate is large, so as to make ε larger and therefore speed up the adjustment of
competitiveness, then δ would need to be even larger still to prevent cyclical overshoot.
3.2 Forward-looking price setting
We can represent a fully forward-looking, perfect-foresight, Phillips curve in continuous time as the
limit, as the interval of time shrinks to zero, of an equation of the form πt = φyt + πt+1. This may
be written as
˙ π = γy, (7)
7where now γ < 0.With this one change the model remains as before.3
Competitiveness is a predetermined variable, but we now suppose that inﬂation is a jump vari-
able. We thus have one predetermined variable and one jump variable. Suppose that there is no
ﬁscal intervention, so that now δ = ς > 0. As a result γδ < 0 and also
 
γ2δ2 − 4γǫ > γδ.This
means that there is one negative eigenvalue and one positive eigenvalue. We suppose — in a conven-
tional manner — that forward-looking price setters are capable of jumping the inﬂation rate so as
to eliminate the unstable root and so putting the economy on a stable path. That is, we assume
that they behave so as to ensure that the transversality condition — that the economy does not
experience explosive behaviour — is satisﬁed.4 As a result the model will be saddle-path stable.
Following an initial shock which causes competitiveness to fall below its equilibrium level, there
will be no gradual, cumulative fall of inﬂation. Instead inﬂation will jump down, and gradually
rise back to equilibrium again, during which time the disturbance to competitiveness will gradually
be removed; competitiveness will gradually return to equilibrium. As it does this the real interest
rate will immediately rise, causing consumption to fall, and so causing output to fall initially for a
further reason, in addition to the eﬀects of worsened competitiveness. But after its initial downward
jump, inﬂation will be gradually rising again, and so the real interest rate will be gradually falling,
and consumption will gradually be rising, back to equilibrium.
There will be no need for ﬁscal intervention in this case to ensure stability, since the behavior of
the private sector in jumping the inﬂation rate will instead ensure this (given that we have assumed
that forward-looking inﬂation will jump in such a way as to cancel out the unstable root in the
system.) In such a setup, forward-lookingness can remove the problem of instability.
3.3 Forward-looking consumption
We can represent the behaviour of fully forward-looking, perfect-foresight, consumers in continuous
time by means of an Euler equation, written as
 
c = ςr, (8)
which, noting the dependence of the real interest rate on the inﬂation rate may be written as
 
c = −ςπ. (9)
























3In the full model in the next section, we present a partly forward-looking and partly backward-looking Phillips
curve; the forward looking component of that Phillips curve is New Keynesian, and so the Phillips curve in the full
model does not have the NAIRU property.
4The system is solved using the Blanachard Kahn procedure.
8As initially, we suppose that inﬂation is entirely backward-looking, and does not jump. Similarly
competitiveness is predetermined. But we suppose that consumption is a jump variable. We thus
have two predetermined variables and one jump variable. The eigenvalues of this system are λ = 0,
and λ = ±
 
−γ(ǫ + ς). There is one zero root, and two pure imaginary roots. We suppose — in a
conventional manner — that forward-looking consumers are capable of choosing the initial level of
consumption so as to put the economy on a stable path. That is, we assume that they behave so
as to avoid Ponzi-game outcomes.5 As a result the model will be saddle-path stable.6
This system will not explode, but it will cycle in an undamped manner. Following an initial
shock which causes competitiveness to fall below its equilibrium level, there will be a gradual fall of
inﬂation. But at some stage competitiveness will improve enough, and output increase enough, so
that inﬂation begins to rise again. Consumption will initially jump down and then begin to rise -
in line with the behaviour of the real interest rate which gradually rises as inﬂation gradually falls.
(The Euler equation shows that along the adjustment path consumption will be rising when the
real interest rate is high.) This happens until the point where inﬂation stops falling; at this point
consumption will start to fall again. The solution will lead to an undamped cycle in all of inﬂation,
competitiveness and consumption.
It is possible to show that if there is any ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation, this will damp the resulting
cycle and if ﬁscal policy is suﬃciently strong this will ensure that there is no cycle. Thus, although
forward-looking consumption can be suﬃcient to prevent instability, it will not, of itself eliminate a
cyclical response. For this some ﬁscal policy is needed (or, as we shall see in the next section some
forward-lookingness on the part of price-setters).
4 A microfounded model of a small member of a monetary union
In this section, we develop a microfounded model in which both inﬂation and consumption are
forward looking and backward looking. This model enables us to explore the potential for instability,
and the possibility of cycles, in more detail than has been done in the previous section, using a model
with proper microfoundations. This model is too complex to allow us to derive analytic results; we
will thus examine a standard calibration of the model.
The model which we develop is in the ‘New Open Economy Macroeconomics’ tradition; we take
the model developed in Kirsanova et al. (2006) and modify it to include eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Our
analytical framework is close to that of Beetsma and Jensen (2005), a setup which we generalise in
three important respects. First, while that paper embodies nominal inertia in the form of Calvo
contracts, we also, following, Kirsanova et al. (2007), allow for some additional backward-looking
inﬂation inertia and so introduce inﬂation persistence, using a set up outlined in Steinsson (2003).
5The system is solved using the Blanachard Kahn procedure.
6Here this involves eliminating any eﬀect of the zero root which would introduce a constant into the solution and
prevent the economy returning to equilibrium.
9(This is realistic, as suggested by Mankiw (2001) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) among many
others.) Second, following Kirsanova et al. (2006), we the allow for some households to be credit
constrained and so unable to implement an optimal consumption plan. As a result the consump-
tion of this group is governed by its current budget constraint and so is backward-looking rather
than forward-looking. (This is also realistic, as argued by Wright (2004).) Third, we introduce
the government solvency constraint into the model. As a result, any short run stabilisation under-
taken by the ﬁscal authorities is constrained, as it should be, by the long-run need to ensure debt
stabilisation.
It is possible to study a monetary union with, say, two countries, each of which is big relative
to the other, as in Kirsanova et al. (2006). Here the country we study is suﬃciently small that
developments in it have no eﬀect on the nominal interest rate in the union, and, for simplicity, we
abstract from the existence of other countries in the world. In this regard, the model similar to that
in Gali and Monacelli (2005b).
We will use this model to study how the dynamic behaviour of the economy is inﬂuenced by
the proportion of backward-looking and forward-looking behaviour, and by ﬁscal policy. We will
describe the behaviour of the economy in response to a particular shock - a shock to the level of
competitiveness rather than to the rate of inﬂation — since the discussion in Section 2 above has
suggested that such shocks are important in a monetary union.
4.1 Households
There are two groups of consumers: those that are credit constrained, and those who are not. For





(1 − α)(1−α)αα, (11)
where we drop time subscripts, since all variables are contemporaneous. CH is a composite of
domestically produced goods given by
CH =








where z denotes the good’s type or variety. The aggregate CF is an aggregate of consumption across
all other countries in the union i
CF =









where Ci is an aggregate similar to (12). There is a public goods aggregate given by
G =








10which implies that public goods are all domestically produced. The elasticity of substitution between
varieties ǫ > 1 is common across countries. The parameter α is (inversely) related to the degree of
home bias in preferences, and is a natural measure of openness.












where we have price indices given by
PH =


















Pi(z)Ci(z)dj = PiCi. (17)

















This allows us to write
  1
0
PiCidi = PFCF. (20)
Optimisation between imported and domestically produced goods implies





is the consumer price index (CPI).










where Nu is labour supply for the unconstrained consumer. The budget constraint facing both








Pi,t(z)Ci,t(z)dzdi+Et{Qt,t+1At+1} ≤ At+(1−τ)(WtNt+Πt), (24)
11where Pi,t(z) is the price of variety z imported from country i expressed in home currency, Dt+1 is
the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio held at the end of period t, W are wages (the same wage rate
is faced by constrained and unconstrained consumers), τ is an income tax rate and Π are proﬁts.
Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoﬀs. Using the deﬁnitions above,
the budget constraint for either group of consumers can be rewritten as
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1At+1} = At + (1 − τt)(WtNt + Πt). (25)
























because they face no constraints on their borrowing (or lending). This optimisation produces the











































where Rt = 1
Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying oﬀ a unit of domestic
currency in t + 1.
Credit constrained households diﬀer from unconstrained households in that they are unable to
borrow all they require to implement their optimal consumption plan.7 The reasons why consumers
might face borrowing constraints are well understood: expectations about future labour income
depend on knowledge of human capital which in many situations is likely to be imperfect and
asymmetric, such that lenders may be unwilling to lend all that agents require to implement their
optimal plan. (The classic reference here is Stiglitz and Weiss (1988).)8 However it is unlikely that
constrained consumers will be unable to borrow anything: we postulate that each member of this
7Ourmanalysis is similar to that in Wright (2004).
8Graham and Wright (2007) diﬀerentiate between constrained and unconstrained consumers by assuming that the
former have a higher discount rate. Here we simply assume that the returns on some forms of human capital are
easier to evaluate than others, and that those workers with more uncertain future earnings are credit constrained.
12group faces an upper limit on their borrowing.9 As a result, the consumption of this group will be








+   D
Et (Qt,t+1Pt) − Pt−1
Pt
, (27)
where   D is an upper limit on borrowing (   D < 0). 10However, it is straightforward to show that the










As constrained consumption is below desired levels, then for a given level of the wage these consumers
will increase their labour supply in an eﬀort to moderate the impact of the borrowing constraint.
4.2 Identities with PPP
The bilateral terms of trade with respect to country i in the union are the price of country i’s goods






The CPI and domestic price level are related as
P = PHSα. (29)





4.3 Allocation of government spending








9The justiﬁcation for assuming a ﬁxed nominal limit on borrowing, at least over the short term, is discussed in
detail in Wright (2004).
10This constraint on nominal debt is what ensures, in Equation (50) below (which is the linearised equation for
constrained consumption), that unconstrained consumption falls if inﬂation falls, because such a fall would raise the
real rate of interest and so cause interest obligations on unconstrained consumers to rise. In the longer term, one
would expect such a nominal constraint to be indexed to the price level.
134.4 Firms and Price Setting
Suppose the production function for ﬁrm j is
Yt(j) = ANt(j). (31)
Both types of consumer supply labour of an identical type, so their is a uniform wage. (This
assumption is not essential, but simpliﬁes the exposition.)




















































































and the log-linearised marginal cost is given as





















where lower case denotes log deviations from steady state. Here κ = Cc/C in steady state, so κ
represents the proportion of consumers who are credit constrained.
Price setting is based on an extension to Calvo contracting set out in Steinsson (2003).11 Each
period agents recalculate their prices with ﬁxed probability 1− γ. If prices are recalculated, then a
proportion of agents ω use a backward looking rule of thumb to reset prices, while the remainder
calculate the optimum price. If prices are not recalculated (with probability γ), they rise at the
steady state rate of inﬂation.
We use an asterisk to denote those ﬁrms that do reset their price. Their average price set is a
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11Christiano et al. (2005) introduce inﬂation inertia by adapting Calvo in a diﬀerent way: they assume that those
ﬁrms that do not calculate the proﬁt maximising price each period instead index their prices, rather than keeping them
ﬁxed as Calvo (1983) assumes. This results in a Phillips curve with inﬂation inertia that has the NAIRU property.
The diﬀerence between these two formulations will not be important for the results in this paper.
14where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 and Y n
t is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output (deﬁned later). The
forward-looking agents are able to solve the ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization and obtain
an optimal solution PF
t , see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). For the rest of the sector the price
will rise at the steady state rate of domestic inﬂation Π = 1 with probability γ, Pt = ΠPt−1. For
the sector as a whole, the price equation can be written as:
Pt =
 
γ(ΠPt−1)1−ǫ + (1 − γ)(1 − ω)(PF
t )1−ǫ + (1 − γ)ω(PB
t )1−ǫ  1
1−ǫ . (34)




Ht+1 + (1 − βθ)(mct + pHt). (35)
This is formula (B.2) in Steinsson (2003). The derivation is the same in our case, so we do not
present it here.
Steinsson (2003) has shown that (formula (A.3))
pB










+ πH,t−1 + δyt−1, (36)






Ht − pHt). (37)
Manipulations with formulae (35), (36) and (37) ( see Steinsson (2003), formulae (A.5), (A.3)
and (A.1)) lead to the following equation
πHt =
γ
(γ + ω(1 − γ + βγ))
βπHt+1 +
ω




(γ + ω(1 − γ + βγ))
yt−1 −
(1 − γ)γβωδ
(γ + ω(1 − γ + βγ))
yt +
(1 − βγ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)
(γ + ω(1 − γ + βγ))
mct.
We can substitute mct from formula (32).
4.5 Capital markets
If we assumed that all consumers were unconstrained, and that capital markets were complete such
that International Risk Sharing applied, then our model would be identical to Gali and Monacelli
(2005a), apart from the addition of inﬂation inertia and credit constrained consumers. However, the
assumption of international risk sharing would seem inappropriate for consumers who are rationed
in credit markets, so we do not assume international risk sharing here. However, we do assume
uncovered interest parity holds, which implies under ﬁxed exchange rates that the domestic nominal
interest rate is ﬁxed, and equal to overseas interest rates. As is well known, a consequence of this
set up is that the steady state for the economy is not unique, but depends on the initial level of
wealth held by unconstrained consumers. (A classic example is Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)).12
12We would get very similar results to those described below if we assumed interest risk sharing applied only to
unconstrained consumers.
154.6 Aggregate Demand
Goods market clearing requires
Y (j) = CH(j) +
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+G = CSα+G. (43)
4.7 Fiscal Constraint and Simple Rules for Fiscal Policy
The government buys goods (Gt), taxes income (with constant tax rate τ), raises lump-sum taxes,
pays an employment subsidy and issues nominal debt Bt. The evolution of the nominal debt stock
can be written as:
Bt+1 = (1 + it)(Bt + PHtGt − τPHtYt − T +  w). (44)
The employment subsidy ( w) and lump-sum taxes (T) are constant and cannot be used in stabi-
lization. This equation can be linearized as follows (deﬁning Bt = Bt/Pt−1, denoting the steady
state ratio of debt to output as ζ; here and everywhere below, for each variable Xt with steady state
value X, we use the notation xt = ln(Xt/X)).













where θ = C/Y in steady state.
We let government expenditure be the ﬁscal policy instrument. We postulate that out-of-steady-
state government expenditure Gt is related to out-of-steady-state debt, and also to inﬂation and to
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16where ΠHt = (1 + πHt).Log-linearisation of this rules yields
gt = φππHt + φsst − φbbt. (47)
In what follows we shall explore the implications of diﬀerent values of ﬁscal feedback parameters.
In all cases, we assume that there is at least a minimum ﬁscal feedback on debt, so there are no
debt sustainability issues.
4.8 The Complete Model
Our system consists of equations (26), (25), (27), (43), (28), (38) and (44) and the equation for
ﬁscal policy. Assuming a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and log linearising (for each variable Xt with
steady state value X, using the notation xt = ln(Xt/X),we obtain the following:
cu
t = cu
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yt = θ(1 − α)((1 − κ)cu
s + κcc
s) + (1 − θ)gt + 2θηα(1 − α)s t + θαc∗
t, (51)
st = π∗
Ht − πHt + st−1, (52)
πHt = χfβEtπHt+1 + χbπHt−1 + ξc(ξcccc
t + ξcucu














gt = φππHt + φsst − φbbt, (55)
where θ = C/Y in steady state and ρ is the share of output produced by workers who are borrowing
constrained. Bars above variables are added to indicate steady state values. The derived parameters
ξ χf and χf in the Phillips curve, and the value of ρ, are given in the Appendix.
How does this model compare with the stylised system outlined in Section 3? Equation (53) is
a generalisation of the simple Phillips curve considered there, where we allow for a combination of
forward and backward price setters. We can get the purely backward-looking, or purely forward-
looking Phillips curves as special cases, although in the latter case expected future inﬂation is
discounted. In addition, inﬂation depends on consumption and on the real exchange rate as well as
on output, reﬂecting the interaction between marginal costs and labour supply.
The ‘IS curve’ in our microfounded model is clearly much more elaborate. However, in both cases
output depends on the level of competitiveness, in this case acting through the terms of trade. The
impact of inﬂation on output varies with the two types of consumer. For unconstrained consumers,
inﬂation (working through real interest rates) inﬂuences the (expected) change in consumption,
and consumption itself is a forward looking, ‘jump’ variable. For constrained consumers, inﬂation
17inﬂuences the level of consumption, and the consumption function is static. The stylised model of
Section 3 can be thought of as a special case in which all consumers are credit constrained. As we
show in the following section, this distinction between forward-looking consumers and backward-
looking ones is critical for issues of stability when inﬂation contains a signiﬁcant backward looking
element.
5 Calibration
In our simple model in Section 3, we were able to analyse stability analytically. In our more complex
model, the algebraic expressions for eigenvalues are intractable, so we need to examine a calibrated
model. In this Section we describe a standard calibration, with particular discussion of credit
constrained consumers.
Our ‘base case’ calibration of most of the parameters is taken from Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997). One period is taken as equal to one quarter of a year. We set the one period discount
factor of the private sector (and policy makers) to β = 0.99. We calibrate ϕ = 2.0 . We assume that
γ = 0.75, which corresponds to an average contract length of one year.
Our knowledge regarding inﬂation persistence is very insecure. All empirical studies are unan-
imous in concluding that an empirical Phillips curve has a signiﬁcant backward-looking compo-
nent. Estimates of the relative importance of backward-looking price setters diﬀer widely. Gali
and Gertler (1999) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) ﬁnd a predominantly forward-looking
speciﬁcation, while Mehra (2004) ﬁnds an extremely backward-looking speciﬁcation of the Phillips
curve. Mankiw (2001) argues that stylised empirical facts are inconsistent with a predominantly
forward-looking Phillips Curve. A ﬁgure of ω = 0.75 corresponds to an equal weight on forward
and backward inﬂation terms suggested by results in Fuhrer and Moore (1995). As a result of this
uncertainty, we look at a range of alternative values between the two extreme cases of complete
forward and backward looking behaviour.
Since the seminal paper by Hall (1978), empirical studies have rejected the simple Euler equation
formulation implied by (26). Studies have also shown that consumption tracks income over the life-
cycle, which is again inconsistent with our model in which all consumers are unconstrained. One
of the most popular explanations for these empirical ﬁndings is that at least some consumers face
binding credit constraints. A large number of papers have tried to estimate the proportion of
consumers who are credit constrained, and many of these are surveyed in Grant (2003). That paper
also suggests that 26-31% of US households are credit constrained. We assume a base value of 30%
for κ, but we also look at the implications of varying this parameter.
The amount of gross debt as a proportion of annual GDP varies substantially between economies.
(It is roughly equal to unity in the UK and Netherlands, for example, is a little lower for the US, but
substantially lower for Italy.) We adopt a base ﬁgure for the constrained debt to annual GDP ratio
of 1.0, but we also investigate the implications of alternative values. We assume that unconstrained
18consumers collectively hold a similar quantity of wealth, so that the net asset position of the country
as a whole is zero. We assume a value of α = 0.3, θ = 0.7, and our demand curve parameters are
ǫ = 5 and η = 1 (as assumed in Gali and Monacelli (2005a)). However, as we show in Kirsanova
et al. (2006), our basic result is robust to these and most other parameter values besides those
associated with credit constrained consumers.
6 Analysis
We use this model to study the eﬀects of an initial unexpected, one-oﬀ shock to competitiveness,
which causes the economy to begin in an uncompetitive position. This could happen because the
underlying competitiveness of the economy changes, so that an initial position, which was initially
competitive, ceases to be so. We study the model’s behavior in the absence of ﬁscal active policy, the
only form of ﬁscal policy consists of a low feedback on debt, φb = 0.05.We how this behaviour varies
with the proportion of forward looking price setters and with the proportion of forward-looking
consumers. In particular, we show that, in the absence of ﬁscal policy, stability is only assured if
there is a suﬃciently large proportion of forward looking prices setters and/or a suﬃciently large
proportion of forward-looking consumers. We also show that a ﬁscal policy which responds to the
level of inﬂation lowers the degree of forward-lookingness which is necessary to ensure stability.
We then show how, even if the economy is forward-looking enough to respond to the shock in
a stable manner, the competitiveness of the economy can overshoot, and the outcome can be a
cyclical process of convergence to equilibrium. Such cycles are bound to impact on social welfare
(see, for example, Kirsanova et al. (2007)).We also show how ﬁscal policy can moderate such cyclical
behaviour.
It would be valuable to study the response of the economy to stochastic disturbances. We leave
this as a study for further work, conﬁning our attention here to analysis of this one shock.
6.1 Instability and the Walters Critique
We consider the combinations of credit-constrained consumers κ and backward looking price-setters
ω, with no ﬁscal feedback present, for which stability is possible. See Figure 6.
In the special case when we have complete inﬂation persistence, ω = 1, a negative shock to
competitiveness will cause inﬂation to fall and this will lead real interest rates to rise. This is a
violation of the Taylor principle. As in our simple model analysed in Section 3, when all price-
setters are also backward-looking and there are no forward-looking consumers, so that also κ = 1,
then the outcome will be unstable. That outcome is depicted at the top right hand corner of
Figure 6. The country’s falling inﬂation, caused by its lack of competitiveness, would cause its price
level to gradually fall relative to that in the other country, and the country’s real exchange rate
would depreciate. This will cause a rise in net exports, and that would cause a stabilising rise in
the demand for output. If also κ = 1 then, even although inﬂation is falling and competitiveness
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provoke a continuing fall in consumption. For reasons explained in Section 3.1, this second eﬀect
would dominate, and output would fall cumulatively in an unstable manner. As noted in Section 3,
this is instability is what was identiﬁed in the ‘Walters’ critique’ of the EMS.
If all price setters were all forward looking, but all consumers were backward-looking then we
are at the top left hand corner of Figure 6. Assuming that forward-looking price setters are capable
of jumping the inﬂation rate so as to ensure that the transversality conditions hold, they will
put the economy on a stable saddle-path, in the Blanchard-Kahn manner. We have discussed in
Section 3.2 what happens then. Following the initial downward shock to competitiveness, inﬂation
will jump down, and gradually rise back to equilibrium again, during which time the disturbance
to competitiveness will gradually be removed. Along the adjustment path, consumption will fall
initially and then gradually rise again.
If all price setters were backward looking, but all consumers were forward-looking then we are
at the bottom right hand corner of Figure 6; numerical analysis of the calibrated model shows this
point to be exactly on the stability boundary. Assuming that forward-looking consumers are capable
of placing the initial level of unconstrained consumption so as to avoid Ponzi-game outcomes, they
will put the economy on a stable path in the Blanchard-Kahn manner. We have described in Section
3.3 what happens then. The system will not explode, but it will cycle in an undamped manner.
Following the initial downwards shock to competitiveness, there will be a gradual fall of inﬂation.
Consumption will initially jump down and then begin to rise - in line with an expectation of higher
real interest rates in the future. (As noted in Section 3.3 the Euler equation shows that, along the
adjustment trajectory, forward-looking consumption must be rising in the presence of a positive real
interest rate.) But at some stage inﬂation will begin to rise again, so that competitiveness begins
to worsen again; consumption will begin to fall again at this point. The solution gives rise to an
undamped cycle in all of inﬂation, competitiveness and consumption.
In the presence of forward-looking consumers and price setters, the system described by our
model involves two jump variables: forward-looking consumption and inﬂation. We suppose that
forward-looking price-setters and consumers are together capable of ensuring that the economy
does not experience explosive behaviour. This requires that they jump the initial level of both
unconstrained consumption and the inﬂation rate so as to place the economy on a stable saddle-path,
in the Blanchard-Kahn manner. Such an outcome requires that there be two eigenvalues outside
the unit circle.13 The solid line in Figure 6 shows the stability boundary for diﬀerent proportions
of credit-constrained consumers κ and backward looking price-setters ω, with no ﬁscal feedback
present. Saddle-path stability occurs to the south-west of the boundary. The stability boundary
shows that stability can be achieved, without ﬁscal intervention, even if neither consumption nor
13In addition there is a unit eigenvalue reﬂecting the unit root process for wealth, a feature not present in our
simpler model.
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κ < 0.55. In that case, then, providing that forward-looking consumers and forward-looking price-
setters are together capable of jumping consumption and the inﬂation rate so as to ensure that the
economy is on a stable Blanchard-Kahn path, stability will be ensured.
The solid line in the ﬁrst column of Figure 7 shows outcomes of this kind, when both price
setting and consumption are partly forward-looking and partly backward-looking, in this case when
ω = 0.75 and κ = 0.3. Along these paths, backward-looking price setters gradually adjust inﬂation
after the shock, and forward-looking price setters adjust inﬂation more rapidly than this. Overall
the movement in inﬂation is gradual, not only because of the weight of 0.75 on backward-looking
price setters, but also because, due to this weight, forward-looking price setters expect a gradual
downward movement in overall inﬂation, and so jump forward-looking inﬂation down by less then
they would have done if all price-setters had been forward-looking. Overall the movement of inﬂation
is more rapid than it would have been if all price setters had been backward-looking. Similarly
backward-looking consumers cut consumption by increasing amounts over the ﬁrst few periods after
the shock, as the rate of inﬂation falls and so the real rate of interest rises. But, in the light of this
rise in the real interest rate, forward-looking consumers initially jump consumption downwards and
then, after the ﬁrst period, cause their consumption to rise again. This continuing rise in forward-
looking consumption, along with the improvement in competitiveness caused by falling inﬂation,
comes to stimulate demand and so gradually to arrest the fall in inﬂation. The resulting turnaround
in inﬂation ensures stability.
The stability boundary shows that forward-looking consumption and forward-looking price set-
ting can substitute for each other in ensuring stability; the ﬁgure shows that the larger the proportion
of consumers who are liquidity constrained, the smaller the proportion of backward-looking price
setters has to be in order to ensure stability. For example, if κ does not have the value of 0.3 as-
sumed in Figure 7 but instead had a value of 1.0, then stability would not be possible if ω remained
equal to 0.75, but would only be possible if ω instead had a lower value of 0.5. In this case the
proportion of forward-looking price setters would be large enough to ensure that, even if there were
no forward-looking consumers to moderate a continuing fall in consumption after an initial shock
to competitiveness, the initial downward jump in the price level would be large enough to ensure
that improvements in competitiveness were large enough to oﬀset the eﬀects of the continuing fall
in consumption.
If the parameters of the economy are such that it lies to the right of the stability boundary
in Figure 6 then a stable rational expectations equilibrium solution will not exist. For example, if
ω = 0.75, but κ > 0.55 then it would not be possible for forward-looking consumers and price setters
to put the economy on a stable saddle-path trajectory. We can see why this is. Suppose that, for
these values of ω and κ, forward-looking price setters expected a gradual downward movement of
inﬂation of the kind shown in Figure 7, for reasons described above. Then, in the expectation of
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few periods after the shock, as the rate of inﬂation fell and so the real rate of interest rose. Stability
requires that this eﬀect be counterbalanced by the behaviour of forward-looking consumers, in the
way shown in Figure 7. But with a low value of κ, this proportion of forward-looking consumers is
small. As a result, any hypothetical attempt by them to jump consumption downwards and then,
after the ﬁrst period, to cause consumption to rise again - in the manner described above - would not
be suﬃcient to cause output to begin to rise again. As a result inﬂation would continue to fall over
time, and the real the interest rate would continue to rise. That would increase the expectation by
forward-looking consumers of higher interest rates in the future, requiring a larger initial downward
jump in the value of forward-looking consumption than what has been supposed - a contradiction.
Figure 6 shows that ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation will raise the value of κ consistent with stability
given any value for ω. This is consistent with the analysis for the backward-looking model presented
in Section 3.1, but generalises that analysis. It is now the case that for a range of values of κ and
ω, stability is possible without any ﬁscal feedback. But a ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation will increase
the range of κ and ω for which stability is possible. This is because as inﬂation falls and the
real interest rate rises, expansionary ﬁscal policy oﬀsets the eﬀects of these higher interest rates
in causing backward-looking consumption to fall. This means that there do not need to be as
many forward-looking consumers to oﬀset this eﬀect, or forward-looking price-setters do not need
to cause inﬂation to fall so fast. Policymakers can thus use ﬁscal policy to ensure that not so much
forward-lookingness is necessary to ensure stability.
If stability is ensured, there may still be a possibility of overshooting and cycles to which we
now turn.
6.2 Overshooting of the Price Level
The solid line in the ﬁrst column of Figure 7 shows that, even when stable, outcomes without ﬁscal
policy intervention may give rise to overshooting and to cycles. In response to a temporary shock
to competitiveness within a monetary union, the real exchange rate s must return to its initial
level. The shock causes output - which depends negatively on competitiveness - to fall. This low
level of output will cause inﬂation to become negative, so that competitiveness rises back towards
equilibrium, as shown. There will come a time when the price level has fallen enough to remove the
reduction in demand which resulted from the initial fall in competitiveness. But, at this point, as
Figure 7 shows, the persistence of inﬂation means that the rate of inﬂation will be negative. Thus
when equilibrium has been reached the price level will still be falling and the real exchange rate will
still be appreciating; i.e. it will overshoot. If the overshoot is large enough, the behaviour of the
real exchange rate will be oscillatory.
Given stability, the oscillatory behaviour will be damped, and the proportion of backward-
looking price setters will determine how damped it is. The ﬁgure shows that the behavior of the
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50 periods. It can be shown that, when ω = 0.5, the model’s dynamic is still cyclical, although the
cycles are much reduced in amplitude after 50 periods. If ω = 0.15 cyclical movements are much
less apparent, although overshooting still occurs in constrained consumption.
There is a contrast here with inﬂation-targeting systems. In such systems, if inﬂation were to
rise above its target level, and then be brought down again by monetary policy, the price level will
slip away from the level which it would have had if, instead, it had risen at a steady rate without
the shock. Such slippages are not normally corrected in inﬂation-targeting regimes. In this EMU
regime, however, such a slippage of the price level is not possible. In this system any rise in the price
level causes loss of competitiveness of the kind studied here. Their level of competitiveness must be
brought to the level at which full employment of resources can be regained by a high enough level
of net exports.
The proportion of unconstrained forward-looking consumers (i.e. those who are not liquidity-
constrained) helps to contribute to cyclicality (whereas it is the existence of liquidity-constrained
consumers which gives rise to the possibility of instability). We can see this from Figure 7. Uncon-
strained consumption initially falls and then begins to rise. The Euler equation shows that it will
not stop rising until inﬂation has risen back to zero (because only then will the real interest rate
have risen back to zero). But as the ﬁgure shows, at that point unconstrained consumption is above
equilibrium. (This is because it will be falling in the future because, with inﬂation persistence, inﬂa-
tion will be positive in the future and so the real interest rate will negative in the future). But this
positive consumption will be adding to the demand pressure caused by the real exchange rate, which
has over-depreciated at that point. Thus although an increase in the degree of forward-lookingness
of consumption makes instability less likely, it does not help eliminate cyclicality. That depends on
the forward-lookingness in price-setting.
6.3 Fiscal Policy Rules
If the economy is not forward-looking enough to ensure stability, or to moderate a process of cyclical
response, then policy-makers may use ﬁscal policy to ensure that the economy behaves more nearly
how it would if consumption and price-setting were forward-looking. Such ﬁscal policy will inﬂuence
how quickly prices, competitiveness and output return to their original levels.
6.3.1 Responding to inﬂation
If the economy is uncompetitive after a shock then - given stability - inﬂation begins to fall. Fiscal
policy can be expanded as this happens. The ﬁrst column of Figure 7 shows the eﬀects of doing
this. Along the adjustment path, ﬁscal policy could cancel out at least some of the eﬀects on
consumption of the higher real interest rates — the consequence of relative disinﬂation — so that the
demand—increasing eﬀects of improved competitiveness can take hold. Kirsanova et al. (2007) show
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in Figure 7 would require a negative feedback from lower inﬂation, to a higher level of government
expenditure — or a positive feedback to the tax rate. This is a ﬁscal feedback rule of the kind
described in Westaway (2003).
In this case ﬁscal policy must also continue to stabilise debt, to ensure that there is no instability
caused by, for example, the loss in tax revenues caused by a loss in output. But the feedback
coeﬃcient can be small, and is set equal to 0.05. This value is large enough to ensure that the
government’s debt stock reaches its steady state value, but otherwise small enough to give policy
the freedom to also help stabilise inﬂation. The reason why very slow adjustment of debt may be
optimal is explored extensively in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2008).
Such a feedback rule would mean that ﬁscal policy would be compensating for the failure of
the Taylor principle to hold in a ﬁxed exchange rate system in response to asymmetric shocks, and
helping to avoid cycles. And the more that such policy stabilised demand and inﬂation the less
would the price level overshoot.
6.3.2 Responding to the real exchange rate
Adjustment of the real exchange rate in the face of a competitiveness shock will require that the
country’s nominal prices end up in a lower position, relative to the level of prices in the EMU area
as a whole. If competitiveness begins below equilibrium, as studied here, then ﬁscal policy might
take additional corrective action of a contractionary kind to help speed the adjustment process.
This form of response is depicted in the second column of Figure 7. It can clearly help to speed the
adjustment process. This would be a parallel to the circumstances in which the monetary-policy
regime can choose the speed at which inﬂation is controlled in the face of an inﬂation shock in
an inﬂation targeting regime. The simple model in Section 3 above has shown that such feedback
from the real exchange rate, and higher speed of adjustment, would make cyclical overshoot of the
real exchange rate more likely. This too is borne out by the pictures shown in the second column
of Figure 7. To prevent such a cyclical response, the feedback on the real exchange rate would
need to be coupled with a stronger response to inﬂation. A ﬁscal response to the level of the real
exchange rate, as well as a response to inﬂation, could bring about more rapid convergence without
cycles. Kirsanova et al. (2007) show that such more rapid, non-cycling, convergence could lead to a
signiﬁcant improvement in welfare.
6.3.3 Responding to debt: the stability and growth pact
It clear that this interventionist policy points in the opposite direction from the Stability and Growth
Pact. The response shown in the third column of Figure 7 shows the aﬀect of operating a policy
more like the SGP, in which there is no ﬁscal feedback on inﬂation and in which spending is cut
strongly in response to an increase in debt. The Figure shows how such a feedback on debt could
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on debt of φb = 0.05. Under the operation of a policy of this kind, a low level of competitiveness
would cause output to fall. But this would cause tax receipts to fall, causing an increase in debt.
Under this policy, government spending would be cut, augmenting the downturn. That would cause
tax revenues to fall, leading to an increase in debt, to a further cut in government spending, further
augmenting the downturn. This is why such a policy can worsen cycles. It is possible to show
that it can make saddle-path stability impossible, for values of the range of κ and ω which would
otherwise make such stability possible.
As already noted above, it is clear that ﬁscal policy must stabilise debt, to ensure that there
is no instability caused by, for example the loss in tax revenues caused by a loss in output. But
as shown in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2008) the optimal feedback coeﬃcient is small, and this
avoids the cycles shown in the third column. This is one of the reasons why it is optimal for the
stabilisation of debt to be slow: it avoids such cycles. A relaxed version of the SGP would allow
that, in each country, ﬁscal policy ﬁxed tax rates and let the deﬁcit run up, and debt increased, as
output fell and tax revenues fell, only gradually reducing so as to bring debt under control.
7 Policy Implications
7.1 Diﬃculties with the Stability and Growth Pact
The above analysis suggests that the ﬁscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact could be unhelpful
in EMU in response to asymmetric shocks. They suggest that if the ﬁscal authorities tightly target
ﬁscal sustainability (aiming, say, for a particular deﬁcit or debt ratio) as in the SGP, this may cause
the economy to cycle, or may even make stability diﬃcult to achieve.
If a country were to follow the SGP, when adjusting to a downturn in competitiveness, the ﬁscal
authorities would be unable to allow the in-built stabilisers to operate — i.e. they would need to cut
government spending. Further this would prevent them from intervening so as to the compensate for
the violation of the Taylor principle. As inﬂation fell and debt increased, government expenditure
would need to fall, causing further falls in inﬂation. The level of competitiveness would be likely
to overshoot, leading to cycles. Secondly the fall in inﬂation would, quite possibly, be undesirably
rapid, possibility making stability diﬃcult to achieve, as suggested by the Walters critique.
There may thus be interference between the ﬁscal arrangements of the SGP, and the need to
adjust real exchange rates and competitiveness between countries within EMU. It appears that the
constraints of the SGP — which — unlike the analysis here may apply asymmetrically to countries
facing competitiveness diﬃculties — do interfere with the ﬁscal policy responses which may be de-
sirable in such countries. Because of this, such countries may experience unnecessary and costly
deﬂation, or instability, or cycles. Our general prescription is that there should be a greater dele-
gation of ﬁscal freedom to those countries which are suﬀering from such sustained negative shocks
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Importantly, such policies, if adopted, must not lead to the postponement of necessary adjust-
ments of the relative real exchange rate. The additional ﬁscal freedom should be used in such a
way as to be consistent with the long run outcome. The analysis here does not suggest that there
be ﬁscal expansion to prevent adjustment in these countries. Instead it suggests that ﬁscal policy
could be used to speed adjustment - ﬁscal expenditures could be cut initially in countries suﬀering
from a low level of competitiveness — as shown in column 2 of Figure 7. But ﬁscal policy would
subsequently become expansionary to prevent adjustment going too far.
Our overall conclusion is that, such additional policy freedom is likely to improve the trade-oﬀs
in the country concerned, resulting in better adjustment to competitiveness shocks, without causing
additional inﬂation.
7.2 A Proposal
We suggest that, for a good outcome, the choice for ﬁscal policy might need to involve
(i) only very gradual feedback from the level of debt to the ﬁscal position,
(ii) active ﬁscal policy feedback which becomes more stimulatory if inﬂation becomes low,
to prevent unstable developments in the price level, and to prevent the price level overshooting, and
(ii) active feedback to ﬁscal policy from the future equilibrium value of the real exchange
rate, being cut if the economy is uncompetitive but becoming more expansionary as the real ex-
change rate depreciates towards its equilibrium level, in order to help prevent the real exchange rate
overshooting.
Thus we are suggesting that the ﬁscal authorities target the longer-term ﬁscal position in such
a way that they steer the real exchange rate towards the appropriate position. Or alternatively,
we suggest they might target (i.e. introduce feedback from) an appropriate future real exchange
rate, where that target is chosen give a competitive position which would be consistent with full
employment.
This course of action seems desirable because the debt ratio per se does not normally, of itself,
have much weight in the authorities’ objective function. The ﬁscal position needs to be sustainable,
as we have seen, but otherwise debt should be allowed to act as a shock absorber, and has been
discussed above. This point is discussed in detail in Kirsanova et al. (2005) and Kirsanova et al.
(2007).
The appropriate real exchange rate would be that which ensured that, after any worsening of
the external competitiveness position which was expected to be sustained, competitiveness was
again returned to a position at which demand for domestic resources was restored. At this point
the level of capacity utilisation would have returned to a normal position, and tax revenues would
have been restored, rather than being low because output was below capacity. At that position the
sustainability of the budgetary position would be assured.
26The contrast between such a conduct of ﬁscal policy, and one directed to the control of deﬁcit
and debt, is as follows. Initially, once it became clear that the position was one of worsened external
competitiveness, ﬁscal policy would be tightened, with the aim of putting downward pressure on
wage and price settlements, so as to help speed the adjustment of the real exchange rate by "Phillips-
curve pressure". But as the adjustment happened, ﬁscal policy would become looser again, to
ensure that downward pressure on wages and prices did not continue to be exercised even after
competitiveness had improved suﬃciently relative to other countries within EMU.
What we are suggesting for ﬁscal policy involves a regime of ‘constrained discretion’. The longer-
term objective for ﬁscal policy, or the ‘constraint’, would remain that of ‘sustainability’. This would
be an objective just like that in the SGP, speciﬁed in accordance with a framework of ‘sustainability
pacts’ (see Coeure and Pisani-Ferri (2005)). The diﬀerence of our approach from that in the SGP
lies in the way in which ‘discretion’ would operate. The policy action which we suggest, in response
to indications of ‘unsustainability’, would be diﬀerent from what is now meant to happen within
the SGP. At present, within the SGP, the required response to such a problem is a programme
of budgetary cuts, even if the problem is caused by a loss of competitiveness, as in the thought
experiment that we have been carrying out. What we are suggesting instead would be a policy
directed towards achieving changes in the real exchange rate over time, towards a long run target.
That target would be the one which was consistent with the sustainability objective. The required
move of the economy towards this position would be assisted by ﬁscal restraint. But that restraint
would be devised so as to help avoid cycles, as has been explained.
There is an additional reason that such a policy might be desirable, beyond that shown in our
modelling simulations discussed above. That modelling work assumed that those setting prices in
a forward-looking way would know by how much competitiveness would need to be improved when
bringing down the inﬂation rate so as to improve competitiveness. In reality it may be diﬃcult
for the private sector to determine the degree of adjustment of competitiveness that is required. If
ﬁscal policy were to target the level of competitiveness, in the way discussed here, that might make
it easier for the private sector to form the appropriate expectations.
The policy framework which we are outlining is not a simple one. But adjustment of the real
exchange rate, in a way consistent with ﬁscal sustainability in the longer term, is not a simple
problem within a monetary union. It is clear that the computation of the appropriate real exchange
rate would require signiﬁcant modelling work. In the same way in which inﬂation targeting does
not operate by the mechanical operation of a Taylor rule, this kind of ﬁscal policy would need
to operate in a non-mechanical way. Such policy might be managed by a national ﬁscal policy
committees, in the way advocated by Charles Wyplosz (Wyplosz (2005)), Jean Pisani-Ferri, and
Simon Wren-Lewis.
278 Conclusion
Europe has been under-performing, not only in terms of productivity performance, but, also in
terms of an apparently unfavourable trade-oﬀ between growth and inﬂation. The normal diagnosis
of this problem has given macroeconomic policy a relatively clean bill of health, and has pointed
instead to supply-side issues and the need for supply-side reform.
This paper presents an alternative argument which focuses on the process of inter-country ad-
justment, and on the connections between this adjustment process and ﬁscal policies within the
euro area. We argue that ﬁscal policy and adjustment issues have, within EMU, interacted in
unfavourable, and possibly destabilising, ways. Our analysis suggests that these problems arise in
particular for countries which are needing to improve their relative international competitiveness,
and which are also suﬀering from downturns in spending resulting from such poor international
competitiveness. It is in countries in these circumstances that ﬁscal rules of the SGP bind most
strongly.
In broad terms, this combination of adjustment problems and binding ﬁscal constraints can be
seen as characterising the ‘German problem’. We believe that the poor performance in Germany
for some years, and some other large countries, has been caused by the problems described in this
paper. We think that this could explain a large part of the euro area’s poor performance in aggregate
in the ﬁrst part of this decade. Our argument suggests that restoring greater ﬁscal sovereignty to
national governments could enable better performance to be achieved in countries such as Germany,
without engendering inﬂation, since there is no reason why such policies should be inconsistent with
the requirement that ﬁscal policy be sustainable in the longer run.
Our arguments do not suggest that supply side problems are not important or that they should
not be addressed. It may be that important supply side reforms and adjustments would be easier
to introduce with a better macroeconomic framework, and that greater conﬁdence in euro area’s
growth potential would then be realised.
28A Coeﬃcients
Coeﬃcients of the Phillips curve can be written as:
χf =
γ
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we obtain the steady state share of output produced by workers who are borrowing constrained (ρ) :
ρ =
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Figure 5: Sectoral Balances for Spain
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Figure 6: Stability boundary as a function of proportion of backward-looking price setters, ω, and
proportion of credit constrained consumers, κ.













































































































































Figure 7: Response to a shock of -1 to competiveness, s. The ﬁgures assume that the proportion of
backward-looking price setters ω is 0.75, and that the proportion of credit constrained consumers,
κ is 0.3. They show the eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁscal feedback parameters.
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